Introduction
Descartes uses an analogy in which philosophy is compared to a tree: "the roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all other sciences " (1984: 186) . It shows that metaphysics is essential in Cartesian philosophy. The methodical doubt, the self, God, the external world and the interaction between the self and the external world are the main themes to focus on for a more thoroughgoing insight into Descartes' metaphysical project. Indeed, the project in the Meditations is best summarized by Cottingham as follows:
[A] dramatic account of the voyage of discovery from universal doubt to certainty of one's own existence, and the subsequent struggle to establish the existence of God, the nature and existence of the external world, and the relation between mind and body. (1993: 8) My argument is that in this project, there is a missing piece without which the project would remain incomplete. This missing piece is nothing other than time. I will focus on the themes mentioned above by trying to reveal the role that time plays therein. I will show that time functions as a sort of ground upon which the Cartesian metaphysical project rests. This is why the notion of time is of great importance to this paper.
It should be noted that the Cartesian notion of time has not yet received the full attention it deserves. Moreover, there is no consensus on Descartes' theory of time. For example, Laporte (1945) and Beyssade (1979) argue that Descartes assumes the continuity of time. However, Copleston champions an atomic theory of Cartesian time (1994: 134) . Bonnen and Flage argue for temporal atomism of a specific sort (2000: 1). On the other hand, Garber argues that "there is no strong reason to attribute either view [temporal atomism or temporal continuity] to Descartes"; instead, he favors a cinematic theory of time (1992: 269; 275-276) . Regarding time, most commentators are divided into two camps: proponents of temporal atomism and proponents of temporal continuity. While temporal atomism holds that "time is a whole consisting of parts", temporal continuity asserts that "time is a whole with no parts" (Bonnen and Flage, 2000: 1) . Both camps have textual evidences to support their conclusions, and these conclusions can be accepted as true albeit to a certain extent.
This makes it hard to attribute a specific doctrine of time to Descartes. The Missing Piece in Descartes' Metaphysical Project: Time For instance, Secada radically argues that "Descartes had no [decisive] views on the matter [of time]" (1990: 46) . That is to say, Descartes did not have a fully developed theory of time. Be that as it may, in this paper, I try to unfold the essential role that time -continuous or discontinuous -plays in Descartes' metaphysical project.
Descartes's project rests on finding a secure path to proceed in the right direction and establish a solid foundation upon which his new system can be built. To accomplish this, Descartes realizes that he has to establish the first principle(s) of philosophy, from which all other knowledge could proceed with certainty (Markie, 1992: 141) . Among these principles are the existence and immateriality of the self (the soul), the existence of God, the existence and materiality of objects, as well as clear and distinct ideas -when used in the singular form as in "the first principle", it always means "the existence of immaterial self (the 'I')". It must be noted that to obtain an insight of any significance into the principles of Descartes' system; we must enter into the details of his method.
The Methodical Doubt
The method Descartes uses in philosophy consists in doubting anything until they are confirmed and secured as true knowledge. In this method, the aim is to remove all obstacles for possessing the first principle of philosophy and to render it unshakable. That is, the doubt ceases to exist when he reaches true knowledge. This is why Descartes' methodical doubt does not lead to skepticism. It is rather used as a tool to reach, first the knowledge of the self, and then the external world by the existence of the supremely good God. Descartes takes the first principle as the basis of his Metaphysics. Nonetheless, before establishing the base, he points out the inevitable: the destruction of the foundation of the former system, and by extension, of the system as a whole (1993: 46) . Such removal is the prerequisite for reconstruction, which cannot happen except using his method of doubt.
The goal of this method is merely to bring all things "within the sphere of the doubtful " (1993: 45) . In so doing, Descartes expects to discover some truth or truths that are beyond any possible doubt. According to Descartes, each person can discover at least one truth which is impos- (Cottingham, 1988: 46) . He aims to use this truth as a first step towards constructing a solid structure in metaphysics. In fact, this method consists of four precepts (see Descartes, 2006: 17) . Yet, what he expresses in the first one is sufficient for our purpose here: to accept nothing in the judgments other than that which is presented to the mind clearly and distinctly (2006: 17) . In his account, the two different properties of the knowledge of true science must be "clarity" and "distinctness".
Descartes states that "we may be assured that all things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true […]" (1993: 42) . Clarity and distinctness are the conditions that will lift a belief to the region of indubitable knowledge. That is to say, if we do not doubt the clarity and distinctness of a belief, then we can call it knowledge. To return to his method, in the Second Meditation, Descartes draws an analogy between his method and that of Archimedes which demands only one fixed and immovable point to "draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and transport it elsewhere" (1993: 48) . Descartes seems to think that, "even mathematical truths can be shown not to be reliable beyond any possible doubt" (Floridi, 2000: 225) . He comes to this conclusion by entertaining the possibility that God is deceiving us even when we are reasoning mathematically. The Missing Piece in Descartes' Metaphysical Project: Time this doubt one step further by formulating a stronger argument which is also known as the "evil genius" hypothesis:
I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams [...] (1993: 49) This hypothesis supposes that all beliefs must inevitably fall within the scope of the methodical doubt. If everything is doubtful, it gives the impression that true knowledge cannot be attained. This seems to bring Descartes face to face with skepticism. As indicated, since true knowledge is attained, skepticism is defeated. The merit of Descartes' method is that the mind frees itself from every sort of bias; it also distances itself from the senses. This is a precondition for starting over in order to establish a secure structure in metaphysics.
The Self: Existence and Persistence
When it comes to the self, our general inclination is to consider it as a "thing" which is the subject or agent of all our thinking activities, i.e.
inner and outer experiences. The self is accepted as an entity, which is the substratum of all our experiences. John Locke formulates this traditionally-considered self. According to Locke, the self is "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and place […]" (1999: 318) . As is clear from Locke's quote, the self is considered as "a thinking being" that preserves its identity over time. This traditional self-holds all my experiences together. Nevertheless, before Locke, Descartes already held that the self is "a thinking thing" by giving it a substantial character. Not even the existence of an "evil genius" can disprove the truth of the assertion: "I exist". As indicated, being skeptical about the truth of all things, including my very self, presupposes my existence. As far as I can think, there is always one thing that I can know for certain, namely: "I exist". Descartes's proof of the existence of the self is based on this line of thought. Here, it is essential to note that even though thinking (as well as doubting) is itself a temporal process (i.e., thoughts are successive; each must follow one another in time), there seems to be no need to time for passing from doubting to self-knowledge. It is because, as Descartes says, doubt -as being a thought -is equal to knowledge (1985: 415) . Thus, the relation between them is atemporal.
2 The proof of the first principle is essential to Descartes' metaphysical project since once the certainty of this principle is established, it will function as the basis of metaphysics:
[W]hile I was trying to think of all things being false in this way, it was necessarily the case that I, who was thinking them, had to be something; and The proposition: "I am thinking therefore I exist" (in Latin, "cogito ergo sum" or simply "cogito") is revealed as the first principle of philosophy.
Descartes concludes that "I" (the self) is a "real thing and really exist[s]"
(1993: 52); it is "a thing which thinks". To put it better, "[i]t is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels" (1993: 54). Since it is considered as "the thing" (the subject; the agent) which holds all our (dispersed) mental If the cogito could be reduced to a syllogistic form, the argument would run as follows:
Premise 1 Everything which thinks exists.
Premise 2 I think.
Conclusion
Therefore, I exist.
First, in this syllogistic form, the conclusion "I exist" is supposed to be inferred from the first and second premises. Yet, as indicated, premise
(1) is, in fact, an inference from the cogito. Second, in this form, "existence" is taken to be derived from "thinking". Nevertheless, as Descartes puts it, it is not possible to think without existing. Recall that there is no before-after relationship between them; the relationship in question is atemporal. That is, in the proposition: "I am thinking therefore I exist", "he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind Mclean, 2006: Iv) . The essential point is that the cogito should not be taken as consisting of two halves; the first one as "I think", and the second as "I exist". Instead, it must be regarded as one thing ("selfevident by a simple intuition of the mind") as in "I think therefore I exist".
The Role of Time in the Persistence of the Self
The Cartesian/substantial self -the bearer of all our mental statessuggests that mental states are discrete and combined into a unity. Any By the external world Descartes means "the existing material universe which we take to be the cause of our sensory perceptions […]" (Cottingham, 1993: 53) . In the Fifth Meditation, before examining the objects that exist outside of us, Descartes begins with inquiring into their ideas.
After having assured himself of the clarity and the distinctness of these ideas, he moves on to investigating the "active faculty capable of forming and producing these ideas " (1993: 92) . That is, he tries to find the cause of the ideas of corporeal objects by focusing on three possible alternatives.
The first is that "I", myself, is the cause of these ideas. This is eliminated immediately for the reason that I am "a thing that thinks" which is distinct from material objects. Accordingly, he argues that these ideas must, therefore, be caused by some substance that is distinct from me. The second alternative is that God might be the cause of these ideas, while the third one is that some other creature (perhaps an "evil genius") is the source of them all. Both alternatives are swept aside just like the first one: The Missing Piece in Descartes' Metaphysical Project: Time he claims that for the world to endure, i.e. for its objects to preserve their identities, God must produce the world anew at every instant:
[A]ll substances generally -[…] all things which cannot exist without being created by God -are in their nature incorruptible, and that they can never cease to exist unless God, in denying to them his concurrence, reduce them to naught […] (1993, 42) That God must continuously create all enduring objects suggests that "an object in time" -just as "the span of life" -is divisible "into an infinite number of [temporal] parts, none of which is in any way dependent on the other" (1993: 69). To bind these parts together, Descartes calls for the assistance of "divine concurrence or intervention". As already indicated, this binding process can only be performed on a temporal basis. As for the demonstration of matter's continuous identity, time must be taken into account here. The argument for this demonstration runs parallel to the demonstration of the persistence of the self. The persistence of the world does not make sense without taking time as a kind of basis upon which the dispersed (temporal) parts of objects are linked together. When it is realized, the essentiality of time comes to the fore.
The Role of Time in the Self Getting Access to the External World
It must be noted that the problem of the interaction between the mind and body is no less different from the problem of the mind's interaction with the external world. Descartes' conception of the mind/self and the body/matter as two distinct substances leads to the problem of accessibility. Having assured himself of the existence of "the self", he concludes that it must be distinct from corporeal objects. He expresses this conclusion in the following:
I thereby concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature resides only in thinking, and which, in order to exist, has no need of place and is not dependent on any material thing. Accordingly this 'I', that is to say, Therefore, Descartes' methodical doubt does not lead to skepticism. This method is rather used as a tool to reach the first principle of metaphysics and secure it as true knowledge. However, the doubt about the existence of the external world continues; this runs the risk of falling into solipsism.
Yet, having proven the existence of God -the uncreated substancethrough the innate idea of perfect being (1993: 71), Descartes knows for sure that God is the foundation upon which the existence of the physical world rests. Thus, God, who is supremely good, keeps Descartes from falling into solipsism.
Descartes takes the self as the thinking substance by separating it from the external world which is the extended substance. These created substances are considered as distinct in the sense that the self's essence is thinking, whereas the matter's nature is an extension. The starting point of Cartesian metaphysics is inner self; yet, it needs to pass to an awareness of the external world. Given this, Descartes faces the problem of the interaction between these two distinct substances. In the end, the interaction between the self and the world is established by God's intervention. God keeps the self and the world in existence -on a temporary basis where they can interact. As Cottingham says, Descartes' metaphysical project, therefore, can be seen as the journey which starts first with the proof -through universal doubt -of the existence of himself, and then the existence of God and the external world; and which later proceeds to the strenuous effort to establish the interaction between the self and the external world (1993: 8) . As demonstrated in detail, in this project there is a missing piece which becomes more noticeable when we look more closely into the persistence of the self and the world along with the problem of the interaction between them.
Apparently, to give accounts of 1) the persistence of the self, 2) of the world, and 3) of the interaction between them is problematic since there is a gap in Descartes' project which is filled by time alone.
Introducing time into Descartes' system to close the gap can be re- Even if time is not incorporated into Descartes' system, it appears that as a result of God's intervention, time -perhaps as a by-productmust somehow be formed as a kind of "basis" ("horizon") upon which his system rests. In this manner, God's interfering with the world in order to establish the persistence of and interaction between the self and the world makes sense. After what has been said, it can be seen that Descartes' system relies heavily on time. As Gorham asserts "without time the Cartesian universe would be an undifferentiated blob " (2007: 29) . In short -metaphorically speaking -time must stretch out beneath the self and the external world so as to secure first the persistence of them both, and then the self's coming out of its inner realm into the external sphere.
Otherwise, Descartes' metaphysical project would collapse on its own 
